Abstract The main objective of this work is to improve the energy-efficiency (EE) of a multiple access channel (MAC) system, through power control, in a distributed manner. In contrast with many existing works on energy-efficient power control, which ignore the possible presence of a queue at the transmitter, we consider a new generalized cross-layer EE metric. This approach is relevant when the transmitters have a non-zero energy cost even when the radiated power is zero and takes into account the presence of a finite packet buffer and packet arrival at the transmitter. As the Nash equilibrium (NE) is an energy-inefficient solution, the present work aims at overcoming this deficit 
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Novelty
In many existing works, both network-centric and user-centric approaches have been studied. In a network-centric approach, the global energy-efficiency (GEE) is defined as the ratio between the system benefit (sum-throughput or sum-rate) over the total cost in terms of consumed power [7, 8] . However, when targeting an efficient solution in an user-centric problem, the GEE becomes not ideal as it has no significance to any of the decision makers. In this case, other metrics are required to reflect the individual interest of each decision maker. Therefore, we redefine the GEE to be the sum over individual energy-efficiencies as a suitable metric of interest [9] .
The major novelty of this work is in improving the sum of energy-efficiencies for a communication system with all the listed features above. In such a decentralized and distributed network, as each transmitter operates independently, implementing a frequency division or a time division multiple access is not trivial. Therefore, we are interested in looking at a MAC system where all transmitters operate on the same band. Additionally, EE will be our preferred metric due to its relevance. This metric has been defined in [10] as the ratio between the average net data rate and the transmitted power. In [11, 12] , the total power consumed by the transmitter was taken into account in the EE expression to design distributed power control which is one of the most well known techniques for improving EE. However, many of the works available on energy-efficient power control consider the EE defined in [10] where the possible presence of a queue at the transmitter is ignored. In contrast with the existing works, we consider a new generalized EE based on a cross-layer approach developed recently in [13, 14] . This approach is important since it takes into account: 1) a fixed cost in terms of power namely, a cost which does not depend on the radiated power; and 2) the presence of a finite packet Cross-layer distributed power control: A RG formulation to improve the sum EE 5 buffer and sporadic packet arrival at the transmitter (which corresponds to including the 4th feature mentioned above). Although providing a more general model, the distributed system in [14] may operate at a point which is energy-inefficient. Indeed, the point at which the system operates is a Nash equilibrium (NE) of a certain non-cooperative static game. The present work aims at filling this gap by not only considering a cross-layer approach of energy-efficient power control but also improving the system performance in terms of sum of energy-efficiencies.
State of the art
Nash bargaining (NB) solution in a cooperative game can provide a possible efficient solution concept for the problem of interest as it is Pareto-efficient.
However, it generally requires global channel state information (CSI) [15] .
Therefore, we are interested in improving the average performance of the system by considering long-term utilities. We focus then on repeated games (RG) where repetition allows efficient equilibrium points to be implemented.
Unlike static games which are played in one shot, RG are a special case of dynamic games which consider a cooperation plan and consist in repeating at each step the same static game and the utilities result from averaging the static game utilities over time [16] . There are two relevant dynamic RG models: finite (FRG) and discounted (DRG). The FRG is defined when the number of stages during which the players interact is finite. For the DRG model, the discount factor is seen as the stopping probability at each stage [17] . The power control problem using the classic EE developed by Goodman et al in [10] has been solved with RG only in [18] where authors developed an operating point (OP) relying on individual CSI and showed that RG lead to efficient distributed solution. Here, we investigate the power control problem of a MAC system by 6 M. Mhiri, V. S. Varma, K. Cheikhrouhou, S. Lasaulce and A. Samet referring to RG (finite and discounted) where the utility function is based on a cross-layer approach. Accordingly, we contribute to:
1. determine the closed-form expressions of the minimum number of stages for the FRG and the maximum discount factor for the DRG. These two parameters identify the two considered RG.
2. determine a distributed solution Pareto-dominating the NE and improving the system performances in terms of powers and utilities compared not only to the NE but also to the NB solution even for high number of users.
3. show that the RG formulation when using the new EE and the new OP leads to significant gains in terms of social welfare (sum of utilities of all the users) compared to the NE. 4 . show that the following aspects of the cross-layer model improve considerably the system performances when comparing to the Goodman model even for large number of users:
-the minimum number of stages in the cross-layer EE model can always be shorter than the minimum number of stages in the Goodman EE formulation.
-the social welfare for the DRG in the cross-layer model decreases slightly when the number of users increases while it decreases considerably in the Goodman model. 5 . show that in real systems with random packet arrivals, the cross-layer power control algorithm outperforms the Goodman algorithm and then the new OP with the cross-layer approach is more efficient.
Structure
This paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we define the system model under study, introduce the generalized EE metric and define the non-cooperative Cross-layer distributed power control: A RG formulation to improve the sum EE 7 static game. This is followed (section 3) by the study of the NB solution. In section 4, we introduce the new OP, give the formulation of both RG models (FRG and DRG) and determine the closed-form expressions of the minimum number of stages and the maximum discount factor as well. Numerical results are presented in section 5 and finally we draw several concluding remarks.
Problem statement

System model
We consider a MAC system composed of N small transmitters communicating with a receiver. The i th transmitter transmits a signal x i with a power
is the maximum transmit power assumed identical for all users (P max i = P max ). The additive noise, which is the same for all users, is an additive white Gaussian noise denoted as n with zero mean and variance σ 2 . We assume that the users transmit their data over block fading channels.
The channel gain between user i and the receiver is given by g i . Thus, the baseband signal received at the receiver is written as:
Therefore, the resulting SINR γ i corresponding to the i th transmitter is given by [18, 19] :
where p = (p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p N ) defines the power vector of all users and can be
The purpose of this work is to determine how each user is going to control its power in an optimum way. Game theory, as a powerful mathematical tool, helps to solve such an optimization problem where the utility function is the EE which is a function of the users powers. Since the system under study has multiple agencies each with individual interest, the sum over individual energy-efficiencies will be considered as the performance metric reflecting the individual interest of each decision maker.
Energy-efficiency metric
The EE is defined in [10] as a ratio of the net data rate to the transmit power level and is given by:
where R is the transmission rate (in bit/s) while
the efficiency function which is sigmoidal and corresponds to the packet success rate verifying f (0) = 0 and lim x→+∞ f (x) = 1. Authors of [11] were the first to consider a total transmission cost of the type radiated power (p i ) + consumed power (b) to design distributed power control strategies for multiple access channels [13, 14] as follows:
In [13, 14] , a more generalized EE metric has been developed by considering a packet arrival process following a Bernoulli process with a constant probability q and a finite memory buffer of size K. The new EE expression is given by:
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where the function Φ identifies the packet loss due to both bad channel conditions and the finiteness of the packet buffer and is expressed as follows:
where Π K (γ i ) is the stationary probability that the buffer is full and is given by:
with:
It is important to highlight that this new generalized EE given by (5) includes the conventional case of (4) when making q → 1.
Static cross-layer power control game
The static cross-layer power control game is a non-cooperative game which can be defined as a strategic form game [17] . 
Definition 1 The game is defined by the ordered triplet
where χ i (p) is given by equation (5) .
In a non-cooperative game, each user (player) seeks to maximize selfishly its individual utility function. The optimum solution results then by setting ∂u i /∂p i to zero as follows:
where
Authors in [13, 14] proved that such equation has a unique best response.
In the game G, this best response defines the NE and is denoted as
. However, the NE solution is not always Pareto-efficient for many scenarios. We highlight in Fig. 1 that the NE is not on the Pareto frontier (the outer boundary of the achievable utilities region). Therefore, we are motivated to design a more efficient solution than the NE. For this, as a first step we investigate the NB solution.
Nash bargaining solution
Due to the inefficiency of the NE, a Pareto-efficient solution can be achieved by introducing the cooperation between the players. The resulting solution is called NB solution whose determination requires two elements [20] :
-the region of achievable utilities formed by the set of the feasible utilities of all the players should be compact and convex [21] ;
-the threat point is defined by the NE of the one-shot game [22] .
Compactness and convexity of the achievable utilities region
We denote R the achievable utilities region defined as follows:
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As the strategies sets S 1 , . . . , S N are compact since
] and the utility function u i is continuous, the region R is compact for a given channel configuration [22] . Since it is generally not convex, time-sharing has been a solution to convexify it. In order to illustrate the main idea of this technique applied to our problem, let us consider a system of 2 users [22] . During a time fraction τ , the users use the powers (p 1 , p 2 ) to have utilities (u 1 , u 2 ). During a time fraction (1 − τ ), they use another combination of powers (p [15, 22] . Thus, the new achievable utilities region (for the 2-users system) is:R
We defineR * the Pareto boundary (the outer frontier) of the convex hull of R. Fig. 1 shows the convexified achievable utilities region with the NE point, the NB solution and the Nash curve (both will be defined next). given by:
The NB solution belongs to the region R N B . Here, in the power control game G, there exists a unique NB solution denoted as
and is given by [21] :
Since the NE can always be reached and the achievable utility region is a compact convex set, the NB solution exists. It is unique since it verifies certain axioms: individual rationality and feasibility, independence of irrelevant alternatives, symmetry, Pareto optimality (efficiency) and independence of linear transformations [21] . The NB solution results from the intersection of the Pareto boundary (R * ) with the Nash curve whose form is m =
) where m is a constant chosen such that there is precisely one intersection point [22] (see Fig.   1 ). Although the NB solution is Pareto-efficient, it generally requires global CSI at the transmitters due to the Nash product (m) introducing all the users utilities [15] . For this reason, we are looking for another efficient solution through the study of the dynamic RG.
Repeated games formulation
RG consist in their standard formulation, in repeating the same static game at every time instance and the players seek to maximize their utility averaged over the whole game duration [16] . Repetition allows efficient equilibrium
Cross-layer distributed power control: A RG formulation to improve the sum EE 13 points to be implemented and which can be predicted from the one-shot static game according to the Folk theorem, which provides the set of possible Nash equilibria of the repeated game [18, 23] . In a repeated game, certain agreements between players on a common cooperation plan and a punishment policy can be implemented to punish the deviators [16] . In what follows, we introduce the new OP and characterize the two RG models.
New OP
The new OP consists in setting p i |g i | 2 to a constant α which is unique when maximizing the expected sum utility over all the channel states. It is given by [19] :α
The power of the i th player is then deduced as follows:
The new OP Pareto-dominates the NE and relies on individual CSI at the transmitter. In order to implement a cooperation plan between the players, we assume in addition to the individual CSI assumption, that every player is able to know the power of the received signal at each game stage, which is denoted by [18] :
When assuming that p i |g i | 2 is set to the constant α, the received signal power can be written as: Accordingly, each transmitter needs only its individual SINR and the constant α (depending only on p i and |g i | 2 ) to establish the received signal power P y .
We assume that the data transmission is over block fading channels and that
] [18] . Thus, the interval to which the received signal power belongs, is
. Since the players detect a variation of the received signal power, a deviation from the cooperation plan has occurred. Indeed, when playing at the new OP, the received signal power is constant and equal to
when any player deviates from the new OP, the latter quantity changes and the deviation is then detected [18] .
Repeated games characterization
A RG is a long-term interaction game where players react to past experience by
taking into account what happened in all previous stages and make decisions about their future choices [24, 25] . The resulting payoff is an average over all the stage payoffs. We denote by t, the game stage which corresponds to the instant in which all players choose their actions. Accordingly, a profile of actions can be defined for all players as p(t) = (p 1 (t), p 2 (t), . . . , p N (t)). A history h(t) of player i at time t is the pair of vectors (P y,t , p i,t ) = (P y (1), P y (2), . . . , P y (t − 1), p i (1), p i (2), . . . , p i (t − 1)) and which lies in the set H t = (∆ t−1 , P t−1 i
) with
(as all the users have the same maximum power) [18] . Histories are fundamental in RG as they allow players to coordinate their behavior at each stage so that previous histories are known by all the players [25] . We denote δ i,t the pure strategy of the i th player. It defines the action to select after each history [18, 25] :
In RG literature, there are two important models [17] :
-the finite RG where the number of stages of the game (denoted as T ≥ 1)
during which the players interact is finite;
-the discounted RG where the discount factor (denoted as λ ∈]0, 1[) is seen as the stopping probability at each stage.
The utility function of each player results from averaging over the instantaneous utilities over all the game stages in the FRG while it is a geometric average of the instantaneous utilities during the game stages in the DRG [18, 25, 26] . We denote δ = (δ 1 , δ 2 , . . . , δ N ) the joint strategy of all players.
Definition 2 A joint strategy δ satisfies the equilibrium condition for the repeated game defined by
for the DRG such that:
In RG with complete information and full monitoring, the Folk theorem characterizes the set of possible equilibrium utilities. It ensures that the set of NE in a RG is precisely the set of feasible and individually rational outcomes of the one-shot game [24, 25] . A cooperation/punishment plan is established between the players before playing [18] [27, 28, 29] . It is important to note that in contrast with iterative algorithms (e.g., iterative water-filling type algorithms), there is no convergence problem in repeated games (FRG and DRG). Indeed, the transmitters implement an equilibrium strategy (referred to as the operating point) at every stage of the repeated game.
Finite RG
The FRG is characterized by the minimum number of stages (T min ). If the number of stages in the game T verifies T > T min , a more efficient equilibrium point can be reached. However, if it is less than T min , the NE is then played. 
such that:
Then, the NE corresponding to the T -stage FRG is given by the following
action plan for any (T, T min ) and ∀t ≥ 1:
for any deviation detection
The quantities A, B, C, D, E, F , G and H are defined in App. A and γ * i is the SINR at the NE whileγ i and γ i are the SINRs related to the maximal utility and the utility min-max respectively (the proof of this proposition is detailed in [19] ). The corresponding algorithm is as follows. 2) In the second phase t ∈ {T − T min + 1, . . . , T }, each user plays the NE.
As the FRG has a finite number of stages, this phase ensures the punishment of the deviator for two reasons [18] :
⋄ if it deviates at the last stage, it cannot therefore be punished;
⋄ if it deviates earlier, the punishment can be not sufficiently severe.
3) The power of the received signal is assumed to be constant during the first phase. When it changes, a deviation is then detected.
4) The deviator is punished by other transmitters by playing at their maximum transmit power P max i .
Discounted RG
In the DRG, the probability that the game stops at stage t is λ(1 − λ) 
Then, the NE corresponding to the DRG is given by the following action plan ∀t ≥ 1:
For the proof, see App. A. The corresponding algorithm is as follows. 2) When the power of the received signal changes, a deviation is detected.
3) The other transmitters punish the deviator by transmitting at the one-shot game with power p * i .
Numerical results
In this section, we consider the efficiency function f (x) = e −c/x with c = 2 R R 0 − 1. It has be proven in [30, 31] The maximum power P max is set to 0.1 Watt while the noise variance is set to 10 −3 Watt. The buffer size K, the packet arrival rate q and the consumed power b are fixed to 10, 0.5 and 5 × 10 −3 Watt respectively. We consider Rayleigh fading channels and a spreading factor L introducing an interference processing (1/L) in the interference term of the SINR.
In Fig. 2 , we present the achievable utility region, the new OP, the NE and the NB solution. We stress that the new OP and the NB solution dominate both the NE in the sense of Pareto. The region between the Pareto frontier and the min-max level is the possible set of equilibrium utilities of the RG according to the Folk theorem. When N > 2, we highlight that lower powers are provided with the new OP which leads also to higher values of the utilities. Thus, we notice that the new OP gives better performances than the NE and the NB solution. Therefore, the new OP contributes not only to improve the system performances better than the NE for any given scenario but also enables important gains in terms of powers and utilities when compared to the NB solution for a system with a large number of users (N > 2). We are interested in studying the performances of the social welfare ( i u i ) according to the FRG versus the NE in a multi-users system. The corresponding expression is given by:
In Fig. 4 , we present the ratio of the social welfare corresponding to the FRG (ω F RG ) vs the NE social welfare (ω N E ). We proceed by averaging over channel gains lying in a compact set such that 10 log 10 (ν max /ν min ) = 20. We highlight that the social welfare of the FRG reaches higher values than the NE (ω F RG > ω N E ). In addition, we notice that the social welfare ratio increases with the number of users for both models (Goodman and cross-layer). The minimum number of stages T min according to the cross-layer model is much lower compared to the one related to the Goodman model. To illustrate this, when N = 3, T min for the Goodman model is equal to 4600 while it is 3700 for the cross-layer model. This difference becomes considerable with the increase of the number of users. Indeed, when N = 4, the minimum number of stages for the Goodman EE is 14300 while it is equal to 10900 for the cross-layer approach.
We are interested in plotting the minimum number of stages as a function In Fig. 6 , we highlight that the minimum number of stages is an increasing function of the packet arrival rate q according to the cross-layer model while The study of the variation of λ max versus the packet arrival rate q (in Fig.   9 ) shows that the maximum discount factor λ max decreases with the number of users and with the packet arrival rate q as well. Simulations show that it exists a packet arrival rate q 1 before which the λ max corresponding to the cross-layer model takes higher values than the maximum discount factor of the Goodman model for different number of users. We notice that starting from q 1 , the maximum discount factor of the cross-layer model converges to λ max corresponding to the Goodman model.
In a second step, we plotted in Fig. 10 the variation of the DRG social welfare as a function of λ ≤ λ max . We notice that ω DRG is an increase function of λ. Thus, when λ = λ max , ω DRG reaches highest value. However, we stress that ω DRG decreases with the number of users especially for the Goodman model while it is quite similar for the cross-layer model. This confirms that the proposed new OP is still quite efficient and can be utilized for games with high number of users. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we have investigated RG for distributed power control in a MAC system. As the NE is not always energy-efficient, the NB solution might be a possible efficient solution since it is Pareto-efficient. However, the latter, in general, requires global CSI at each transmitter node. Thus, we were motivated to investigate using the repeated game formulation and develop a new OP, that simultaneously is both more efficient than the NE and achievable with only individual CSI being required at the transmitter. Also, we consider a new EE metric taking into account the presence of a queue at the transmitter with an arbitrary packet arrivals.
Cooperation plans are proposed where the new OP is considered and closed-form expressions of the minimum number of stages for the FRG and the maximum discount factor for the DRG have been established. The study of the social welfare (sum of utilities of all the users) shows that considerable gains
Cross-layer distributed power control: A RG formulation to improve the sum EE 29 are reached compared to the NE (for the FRG and DRG). Moreover, our model proves that even with a high number of users, the FRG can always be played with a minimum number of stages shorter than when using the Goodman model. In addition, the social welfare in the DRG decreases slightly with the number of users with the cross-layer approach while it decreases considerably with the Goodman model. Finally, the comparison of the cross-layer algorithm versus the Goodman algorithm, shows that in real systems with random packet arrivals, the cross-layer power control algorithm outperforms the Goodman algorithm. Thus, the new OP with the cross-layer approach is more efficient.
An interesting extension to this work would be to consider the interference channel instead of the MAC channel and generalize the framework applied here. Another possible extension would be to consider the multi-carrier case and the resulting repeated game.
the sign of ∂φ(γ i ) ∂γ i . We have:
The sign of the first term is negative while the sign of the second term is the same as ∂Π(γ i )/∂γ i since (1 − f (γ i )) > 0 and we have:
However ρ(γ i ) = q(1 − f (γ i )) (1 − q)f (γ i ) and then:
As shown in [13] , we have:
The latter quantity can be expressed as:
Consequently, we have:
Therefore, ∂Π(γ i ) ∂γ i < 0 and hence ∂φ(γ i ) ∂γ i < 0. In particular, we have ∂φ(γ i ) ∂γ i < 0. Thus, we have
∂γ i > 0 and finally ∂u i (ṗ i , p −i ) ∂p j < 0. We deduce then thatu i is a decreasing function of p j . It
